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BARGAINING WITHOUT THE BLINDFOLD:
ADAPTING CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
PRACTICE TO A PLEA-BASED SYSTEM
ALEX KARAMBELAS†
INTRODUCTION
In 2015, Terrell Gills was arrested on charges related to a
Dunkin’ Donuts robbery in Queens, based on a partial DNA
match.1 His attorney’s investigation yielded news articles about
two other Dunkin’ Donuts robberies in the same area, which took
place in the same week.2 In the eighteen months following his
arraignment, Mr. Gills was incarcerated at Rikers Island because
he was unable to afford his $10,000 bail.3 During that period, Mr.
Gills’s attorney made repeated requests for information related
to the other two robberies.4 It was not until four days before trial
that the prosecution disclosed reports from the arresting officers
which revealed that a different defendant had been arrested and
pleaded guilty to the other two robberies.5 Upon being interviewed by Mr. Gills’s attorney, the other defendant confessed to
the third robbery with which Mr. Gills was charged.6 The trial
went forward, and Mr. Gills was acquitted.7
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Mr. Gills’s case is an outlier not because discovery was withheld until less than a week before trial, but rather because he did
not plead guilty.8 Statistically, in the vast majority of cases, a
defendant in Mr. Gills’s situation would have taken a guilty plea,
which would have included a waiver of the right to discovery.9
New York Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) article 245, which
came into effect in January 2020, introduced sweeping changes to
criminal discovery procedure in New York, which would have
prevented the eighteen-month delay before the disclosure of
arrest reports.10
This Note argues that pretrial discovery practice should shift
from a trial-centric model to one focused on broad pre-plea disclosures through statutory reform. Part I of this Note compares the
old New York discovery statute and federal discovery practice
with the recent New York discovery reforms. Part II surveys the
various approaches to discovery procedure in practice, both in
New York, under CPL article 240, and at the federal level, under
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Because
both Rule 16 and CPL article 240 are so restrictive, informal
practices and local rules have developed to fill the practical gaps
left by these provisions. Part III argues that the problem of
adapting discovery practice to a plea-based criminal justice
system is best solved through legislative reform efforts, rather
than piecemeal policies and local rules. Part IV addresses the
role played by discovery in the plea negotiation process. This
Part argues that broad pre-plea disclosure serves to ensure that
plea agreements are informed, accurate, and efficient.
I. BACKGROUND: DISCOVERY PRACTICE IN
NEW YORK AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
Except with specific and limited exceptions, criminal discovery is a creature of statute. Defendants have no constitutional or
common law right to general discovery in a criminal case.11 Since
1979, New York criminal discovery has been governed by CPL
article 240.12 Criminal justice reforms, addressing discovery,

8

See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
See infra note 144 and accompanying text.
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See generally N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 245.20 (McKinney 2019).
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United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002); see also Wardius v. Oregon,
412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973).
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speedy trial, and bail, were passed in April 2019.13 The new
discovery statute in CPL article 245 represents a sea change in
New York criminal discovery practice and the overall balance of
power in pretrial procedure.
A.

New York Discovery Practice Under the Old Statute

The discovery procedures set forth in article 240 were among
the most restrictive in the nation, in terms of both the scope and
the timing of disclosures.14 The discovery process under article
240 was demand-based—rather than automatic—meaning that
the discovery process began with a written demand from the
defense and the scope of the required disclosures was limited.15
The right to discovery was only triggered after the filing of a
felony indictment or misdemeanor information.16 The Appellate
Division has held that defendants have “ ‘no right to discovery
prior to indictment,’ statutory or otherwise.”17 For misdemeanors, this restriction can result in a defendant who has no right to
discovery material for ninety days following arraignment; a felony defendant could have no right to discovery for as long as six
months.18 This period immediately after arrest is crucial both for
effective defense investigation and plea bargaining, because prosecutors often offer plea agreements prior to the filing of an
indictment or information.19
Pretrial access to discovery outside the procedures in article
240 was dependent on the internal policies of the District Attorney’s office for each county. A preliminary hearing prior to indictment, sometimes called a probable cause hearing or a felony
exam, could provide the defense with detailed information about

13
See Christian Nolan, New York Removes the Blindfold, N.Y. ST. B.J., May
2019, at 12, 12.
14
N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON CRIMINAL DISCOVERY 2–
3 (2015), https://nysba.org/app/uploads/2020/02/Criminal-Discovery-Final-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S3DS-6HXH] [hereinafter NYSBA REPORT]; see also N.Y.C.L. UNION, DISCOVERY IN THE DARK: NEW YORK’S SECRET EVIDENCE RULES 17–22 (2019),
https://nyclu.org/sites/default/files/discoveryinthedark_2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/42P9V4S7].
15
See ch. 412, § 2, 1979 N.Y. Laws at 1–2.
16
Id.
17
People v. Reese, 23 A.D.3d 1034, 1035 (4th Dep’t 2005) (quoting People v.
Walker, 15 A.D.3d 902, 903 (4th Dep’t 2005)).
18
Jenny Roberts, Too Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty
To Investigate, and Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1097, 1128 & nn. 141–42 (2004).
19
Id. at 1128–29.
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the prosecution’s case.20 However, such hearings are rarely used,
as prosecutors generally choose the less onerous grand jury proceeding.21 In addition to such preliminary hearings, defendants
could receive substantive early discovery through voluntary
disclosure by the prosecution. As discussed in more detail in
Part III, some counties adopted internal “open file” discovery policies. However, the extent of the materials produced during
voluntary disclosures varied from county to county and prosecutor to prosecutor.22
The timeline for critical discovery under article 240 was tied
to trial rather than arraignment. By contrast, the new statute
introduces a deadline which starts from the date of arraignment,
including on a felony complaint. The treatment of Rosario material illustrates how critical discovery material was treated as a
trial right under article 240. Rosario is a judicially created rule,
later codified in CPL section 240.45, that requires the disclosure
of prior recorded statements of prosecution witnesses made to the
police, the prosecution, or the grand jury.23 For witnesses testifying at a hearing, their prior statements did not need to be
disclosed until “prior to the commencement of the direct
examination.”24 For trial witnesses, CPL section 240.45 did not
require the prosecution to disclose Rosario material until after
the jury had been sworn and prior to the prosecution’s opening
statement.25 As such, defendants had no right to Rosario material until after the trial or hearing had already commenced,
making any investigation based on that information impracticable.
Similar to the timing of Rosario material, the disclosure of exculpatory evidence under Brady was tied to the trial timeline and
20

Id. at 1124.
Id. at 1124–25. Notably, during the COVID-19 pandemic, prosecutors were
forced to use preliminary hearings, when it became impractiable to convene grand
juries. See Paul McDonnell, N.Y.’s Legal Limbo: Pandemic Creates Backlog of 39,200
Criminal Cases, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/22/
nyregion/coronavirus-new-york-courts.html [https://perma.cc/5WUZ-PHZ7] (“Unable
to convene grand juries, the city’s five district attorneys are turning instead to
preliminary hearings, which have not been conducted in New York in decades.”).
22
See N.Y. CNTY. LAWS.’ ASS’N, DISCOVERY IN NEW YORK CRIMINAL COURTS: SURVEY REPORT & RECOMMENDATIONS 10–12 (2006), https://www.nycla.org/siteFiles/
Publications/Publications228_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5X64-AK6C] [hereinafter NYCLA
SURVEY].
23
People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y.2d 286, 289 (N.Y. 1961); People v. Gillis, 220 A.D.2d
802, 805 (3d Dep’t 1995).
24
Criminal Procedure Law, ch. 412, § 2, 1979 N.Y. Laws 3 (repealed 2019).
25
Id.
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took place late in the process under the old statute. Although
there was no fixed timeline for Brady disclosures in article 240,
such disclosures were considered “presumptively ‘timely’ ” if they
were made no less than thirty days prior to the commencement of
trial for a felony, and no less than fifteen days prior to trial for a
misdemeanor.26 These trial-centric timing requirements under
article 240 resulted in meager pre-plea disclosures.
The challenges presented by the timeline for discovery under
the old statute were compounded by the narrow scope of discovery available to defendants. The scope of discovery available to the
defense under article 240 was limited to eleven enumerated
categories of materials.27 The Court of Appeals held that “[i]tems
not enumerated in article 240 are not discoverable as a matter of
right unless constitutionally or otherwise specially mandated.”28
As a result, basic materials—such as the non-privileged portions
of police notes or official investigation reports—were not included
in the required discovery unless the prosecution intended to
introduce them at trial.29
Apart from the eleven enumerated categories, much of what
defendants received came from constitutionally mandated minimum safeguards rather than statutory provisions. For example,
the old statue did not include a provision requiring the disclosure
of exculpatory evidence but rather directed prosecutors to comply
with constitutional requirements without further guidance.30
This provision had been interpreted as requiring the prosecution
to turn over “material” exculpatory evidence, which would have
created a “reasonable possibility” of a different outcome.31 By contrast, discovery laws in many other states require the prosecution to disclose all exculpatory information rather than just that
exculpatory evidence which is determined to be material by the

26

7 LAWRENCE K. MARKS, NEW YORK PRETRIAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 7:50
(2d ed. 2019) (commonly referred to as the “DiFiore Order”); see also Janet DiFiore,
Chief Judge of the State of N.Y., State of Our Judiciary Address 9 (Feb. 6, 2018),
http://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/news/soj2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/TER6-4QEJ].
27
See generally William C. Donnino, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 240.20 (McKinney 2014).
28
People v. Colavito, 87 N.Y.2d 423, 427 (N.Y. 1996).
29
People v. Finkle, 103 Misc. 2d 985, 986 (Sullivan Cnty. Ct. 1980); NYSBA
REPORT, supra note 14, at 4.
30
Ch. 412, § 2, 1979 N.Y. Laws at 1–2; see also Colavito, 87 N.Y.2d at 427 (“The
CPL does not expressly compel pretrial discovery of evidentiary material . . . which
the prosecution intends to introduce at trial.”).
31
People v. Fuentes, 12 N.Y.3d 259, 263 (N.Y. 2009).
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prosecution.32 In addition to Brady material, witness identities
and statements are often at the heart of a criminal case and
would be central to any defense investigation of the charges.
While defendants were entitled to the names and pretrial statements of prosecution witnesses as Rosario material, defendants
had no right to the names, contact information, or statements of
witnesses who had relevant information unless the prosecution
chose to call them at a hearing or trial.33
The compressed, trial-focused timeline for discovery and the
limitations on discoverable materials were tied with the issue of
prosecutorial readiness. Under CPL section 30.30 the speedy trial right in New York is tied to prosecutorial readiness, rather
than a specified period of time. A defense motion to dismiss must
be granted when the prosecution fails to announce its readiness
for trial within six months of the commencement of the action for
a felony and ninety days for a Class A misdemeanor.34 After the
prosecution announces that it is ready for trial, only the time
requested by the prosecution is counted against it for section
30.30 purposes.35 As such, a prosecutor may ask for a short,
week-long adjournment, but the judge will often set the next date
for a month or more due to the court’s calendar.36 Regardless of
how long the actual adjournment is, only the week requested by
the prosecution is counted for speedy trial time.37 Once the prosecution announces their readiness for trial, the speedy trial
“clock” stops.38 Prior to the enactment of article 245, prosecutorial readiness and discovery were not linked, either in the statute
or in the caselaw.39 In People v. Anderson, the prosecution announced its readiness for trial when substantial discovery,
including Rosario material, a supplemental bill of particulars,
and lab reports were still outstanding.40 The Court of Appeals
held that the delay attributable to outstanding discovery obligations was not chargeable to the prosecution, because such a delay
32
NYSBA REPORT, supra note 14, at 5 & n.11 (listing Arizona, California,
Colorado, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Texas, and Washington).
33
Roberts, supra note 18, at 1129–30; see People v. Miller, 106 A.D.2d 787, 788
(3d Dep’t 1984).
34
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30(1)(a)–(b) (McKinney 2019).
35
Daniel Hamburg, A Broken Clock: Fixing New York’s Speedy Trial Statute, 48
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 223, 247–48 (2015).
36
Id. at 248.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 247–48.
39
See People v. Anderson, 66 N.Y.2d 529, 541–42 (N.Y. 1985).
40
Id. at 539.
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did not affect the prosecution’s ability to proceed to trial, and because article 240 contained other remedies for such delays.41
Because of the lack of any connection between discovery compliance and speedy trial under the old statutes, prosecutors were
able to announce ready prior to discovery disclosures.42 A declaration of readiness without discovery put the defendant in the
position of choosing between stopping the speedy trial clock herself and requesting adjournments while waiting for discovery, on
the one hand, or proceeding to trial without the benefit of discovery, on the other. Assuming that the statement of readiness was
not illusory, there was nothing objectionable about this practice
under article 240. Practically, this resulted in incarcerated defendants remaining in pretrial detention without discovery materials or the prospect of release on speedy trial grounds. Such
delay without discovery often resulted in the inducement of illinformed guilty pleas as a means to get out of detention or to
avoid the collateral consequences of an open case.43
This structural disconnect between discovery compliance and
readiness was problematic even when prosecutors made goodfaith statements of readiness and strove to comply with discovery
obligations. But, as demonstrated by internal training documents
from the Bronx District Attorney’s Office, it was common practice
for some offices to engage in gamesmanship with the explicit goal
of stretching out a case prior to the fulfillment of their discovery
obligations.44 The internal documents showed that Bronx ADAs
were trained to announce readiness for trial at arraignment, and
to request only minimal adjournments, relying on the court
granting more time than was requested due to “court congestion.”45 This practice was perfectly acceptable under the old

41

Id. at 543.
Readiness required a triable accusatory instrument, the availability of
witnesses, and the removal of “all legal impediments to the commencement of [the
prosecution’s] case.” John H. Wilson, When Are the People Ready? The Interplay
Between Facial Sufficiency and Readiness Under CPL Section 30.30, 35 PACE L. REV.
999, 1001 (2015).
43
See infra notes 147–150 and accompanying text.
44
George Joseph & Simon Davis-Cohen, Internal Documents Reveal How Bronx
Prosecutors Are Taught To Slow Down Cases, APPEAL (Aug. 2, 2018), https://theappeal
.org/internal-documents-reveal-how-bronx-prosecutors-are-taught-to-slow-down-cases/
[https://perma.cc/87WY-VCFV]. One training slide titled “THE POKER GAME” advised trainees to “[k]eep your poker game face on” because “you are ready” and “YOU
WILL NEVER BE MORE READY THAN AT ARRAIGNMENTS OR THE FIRST
TIME THE CASE IS ON AFTER ARRAIGNMENTS.” Id.
45
Id.
42
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discovery and readiness statutes. Specifically, one training slide
advised trainee ADAs, “The People CAN be ready without having
supplied discovery!! There will be consequences. There may even
be sanctions, but it: DOES NOT PRECLUDE A VALID STATEMENT OF READINESS.”46 As such, it was common for defendants to find themselves incarcerated with no meaningful
discovery, no indication as to the strength of the prosecution’s
case, and no prospect of release on speedy trial grounds.47 The
lack of discovery combined with illusory statements of readiness
set the stage for uninformed guilty pleas, regardless of the
defendants’ factual guilt or innocence.
The training materials distributed by the Bronx District
Attorney’s Office speak to a larger problem with the old discovery
regime: insufficient consequences. The consequences for noncompliance were so minor and rarely applied in practice that they
were functionally meaningless. Discovery violations are, by their
nature, difficult for the defense and courts to detect.48 In the
cases where violations came to light, they were subject to strictly
construed “materiality and harmless-error standards.”49 Although
CPL section 240.70 set forth a number of possible sanctions for
statutory violations,50 in practice the only remedies imposed were
“adjournment[s] to investigate” or an “adverse inference.”51 Even
where the prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence until his
closing statement, the Court of Appeals held that any error from
the nondisclosure was cured by interrupting the closing statement and allowing the defense time to recall a witness.52 As
countless examples show, the delayed disclosure of evidence often
came with few consequences in practice.

46

Id.
Id.
48
Ben Grunwald, The Fragile Promise of Open-File Discovery, 49 CONN. L. REV.
771, 781 (2017).
49
Id.
50
Criminal Procedure Law, ch. 412, § 2, 1979 N.Y. Laws 4 (repealed 2019).
51
William C. Donnino, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 240.70
(McKinney 2014); see, e.g., People v. Beam, 161 A.D.2d 1153, 1153 (4th Dep’t 1990)
(failure to disclose “Brady material until the commencement of trial”); People v.
Cunningham, 189 A.D.2d 821, 822 (2d Dep’t 1993) (delayed disclosure of ballistics
evidence); People v. Hess, 140 A.D.2d 895, 896–97 (3d Dep’t 1988) (failure to disclose
“an accident reconstruction report . . . until the eve of trial”); People v. Williams, 227
A.D.2d 906, 906–07 (4th Dep’t 1996) (failure to disclose 911 tapes until less than one
week prior to trial).
52
People v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41, 68 (N.Y. 1984).
47
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In People v. Tovar-Ramirez, a Bronx County case, the defendant was arraigned on misdemeanor charges on August 6, 2017.53
Four court orders and 178 days later, the prosecution ultimately
made its initial discovery disclosures on January 31, 2018.54 The
defense moved to preclude the delayed evidence.55 The defense
argued that “[i]t is very difficult, if not impossible, to properly
determine the strength of a case without discovery” and that the
multiple additional appearances necessitated by the delay “pressure[d] [the defendant] to plead guilty” to avoid further court
appearances.56 The court found that, despite the lengthy delay in
disclosure, no sanction was warranted, because the defense was
given the opportunity to examine the materials at issue before
the matter proceeded to hearing or trial.57 The lack of meaningful consequences for delay combined with the trial-based timeline
and narrow scope of article 240 resulted in a statutory regime
that was ill-suited to a plea-based system.
B. Federal Criminal Discovery Practice
Like article 240, federal discovery rules also feature trialfocused timelines and narrow disclosure requirements. Criminal
discovery at the federal level is primarily governed by Rule 16 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as well as by constitutional requirements from Brady and its progeny.58 Rule 16 does
not codify the government’s discovery obligations under the
Brady Rule. However, Rule 16 requires the disclosure of documents and tangible objects “material to preparing the defense,”
which has been interpreted as including evidence “favorable” to
the defendant.59 Additionally, there is no timeframe for the disclosure of such evidence in Rule 16, meaning that the actual
timing of Rule 16 disclosures varies based on local practice and
internal policy.
In terms of scope, Rule 16 provides for limited pretrial
discovery.60 The statute enumerates five categories of discover53

People v. Tovar-Ramirez, 59 Misc. 3d 1061, 1062 (N.Y.C. Crim. Ct. Bronx Cnty.

2018).
54

Id.
Id. at 1062–63.
56
Id. at 1063 (first alteration in original).
57
Id. at 1066, 1068.
58
See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
59
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i); see also Brady, 373 U.S. at 86–87.
60
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A)–(G).
55
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able material which the government is required to disclose to the
defense: oral and recorded statements of the defendant, the
defendant’s prior criminal record, a limited category of documents and tangible objects, reports of examinations and tests,
and material relating to the government’s expert witnesses.61
This is an exclusive list that specifically does not require the
disclosure of government documents or reports, including police
reports.62
While witness statements are not discoverable under Rule
16, they are disclosed as Jencks material, which is similar to
Rosario material, under the Jencks Act.63 In Jencks v. United
States, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the
defense was entitled to all reports of written and oral statements
made by government witnesses, relating to the subject of their
testimony.64 Almost immediately after the Court’s decision in
Jencks, Congress passed 18 U.S.C. § 3500, the Jencks Act, which
codified the substance of the Court’s holding but limited its
practical use by requiring that no such statement shall be subject
to discovery until after the witness has testified on direct
examination.65 While many offices adopt internal policies and
turn over Jencks material prior to trial in order to avoid midtrial
delays,66 courts may not compel the production of such material
prior to trial over the government’s objection.67 Given the timing
provision of the Jencks Act, the defense may not receive any
witness statements until after the witness has testified, rendering Jencks material all but useless for investigative and plea
bargaining purposes.
The statutory treatment of witness statements under the
Jencks Act is emblematic of the lack of focus on the plea
bargaining stage in traditional discovery practice. Similar to
article 240, the timeline and scope of federal discovery rules
evince a trial-centric approach that fails to adequately serve a
system in which less than four percent of defendants go to trial.68

61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

Id.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2).
18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2018).
353 U.S. 657, 668–69 (1957).
18 U.S.C. § 3500(a), (b).
See infra notes 102–103 and accompanying text.
See United States v. Percevault, 490 F.2d 126, 128–29 (2d Cir. 1974).
See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
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C. Broadening of New York Discovery Practice Under the New
Statute
By contrast, article 245 includes a requirement of automatic
discovery no later than twenty days after arraignment for incarcerated defendants and no later than thirty-five days for all
others.69 Article 245 requires functional “open file” discovery
from the prosecution. Prosecutors are required to disclose “all
items and information that relate to the subject matter of the
case.”70 Additionally, the statute includes a non-exhaustive list
of twenty-one specific types of material which must be disclosed,
using broad “including but not limited to” language.71 Article 245
imputes possession of material and information in the custody of
New York State law enforcement to the prosecution72 and requires the free flow of information between the prosecuting office
and law enforcement.73 The new statute includes a presumption
of openness in favor of disclosure when interpreting the provisions relating to the timing of discovery, disclosure prior to
guilty pleas, and the scope of automatic initial discovery.74
Unlike article 240 and the federal rules, the timeline for discovery under article 245 is tied to arraignment and reflects the
reality that most defendants will not go to trial. Under article
245, the required prosecution disclosures are to take place “as
soon as practicable” but not later than twenty calendar days after
the arraignment of an incarcerated defendant or thirty-five days
for defendants at liberty, on any charging instrument, including
misdemeanor and felony complaints.75 However, this deadline
may be extended by an additional thirty days without a motion
where the material in question is “exceptionally voluminous” or
where such material is not in the possession of the prosecution,
“despite diligent, good faith efforts” to locate same.76

69

The deadline was originally fifteen days after arraignment for all offenses.
However, this timeline was extended in the Fiscal Year 2021 budget legislation. The
deadline remains fifteen days from arraignment for Vehicle and Traffic Law
violations and other petty offenses. See Ch. 56, pt. HHH, § 1(a)(i)–(iii), 2020 N.Y.
Laws (2020 McKinney’s Session Law News of N.Y.).
70
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 245.20(1) (McKinney 2019).
71
Id. § 245.20(1)(a)–(u).
72
Id. § 245.20(2).
73
Id. § 245.55(1).
74
Id. § 245.20(7).
75
Id. § 245.10(1)(a); Ch. 56, pt. HHH, § 1(a)(i)–(iii), 2020 N.Y. Laws (2020
McKinney’s Session Law News of N.Y.).
76
CRIM. PROC. § 245.10(1)(a).
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The new discovery law also addresses the problem of readiness without discovery. The new speedy trial statute, which was
passed with the discovery reforms, requires prosecutors to file a
certification of good faith compliance with the section 245.20
discovery disclosures in order to announce ready for trial and
affords defense counsel the opportunity to be heard on the record
as to the status of the disclosure.77 By tying readiness to discovery compliance, defendants are no longer forced to choose between proceeding to trial without any meaningful discovery and
waiving their speedy trial rights.
Although the changes to both the scope and timing of
discovery disclosures represent a dramatic change from prior
practice, they are not inflexible requirements. Article 245 allows
either party to obtain a protective order on the record, ex parte,
or in camera upon a showing of good cause.78 This provision
grants broad judicial discretion in terms of the type of remedy a
court may impose, stating that any kind of discovery may be
“denied, restricted, conditioned or deferred” or may be subject to
“such other order as is appropriate.”79 The party seeking a protective order is entitled to expedited appellate review of an
adverse ruling.80 In addition to protective orders, the court may
alter the timeline for discovery upon motion from either party,
showing good cause.81
In one of the most dramatic shifts from the old rule, article
245 requires the prosecution to complete discovery no later than
three days prior to the expiration of a pre-indictment plea offer
and no later than seven days prior to all other plea offers.82 If the
prosecution fails to make necessary disclosures before the expiration of an offer, the court is required to consider, upon
defense motion, “the impact of [such a] violation on the defendant’s decision to accept or reject [the] offer.”83 Furthermore, if
the court finds that the violation materially affected the defendant’s decision, the prosecution must either reinstate the offer or
the court must preclude the admission of any improperly
withheld evidence at trial “as a presumptive minimum sanction.”84
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

Id. § 30.30(5).
See id. § 245.70.
Id. § 245.70(1).
Id. § 245.70(1), (6).
Id. § 245.70(2).
Id. § 245.25(1)–(2).
Id.
Id.
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Additionally, while defendants who plead guilty may waive their
rights to discovery, a “plea offer may not be conditioned upon
such [a] waiver.”85 This is significant, given that, before discovery reform, such waivers were ubiquitous in plea agreements.86
The pre-plea discovery provision goes well beyond the reforms recommended by the New York State Bar Association’s
Task Force on Criminal Discovery report from 2015.87 In that report, NYSBA specifically declined to recommend a statutory preplea obligation to complete discovery.88 Given the overwhelming
prevalence of plea agreements, a statutorily based, enforceable
obligation to provide discovery prior to the expiration of a plea
offer has profound implications for criminal practice overall.
II. VARIOUS APPROACHES TO CRIMINAL DISCOVERY REFORM
In both New York and the federal system, prosecutors and
local courts have made attempts to ameliorate the effects of existing discovery rules through internal policies and local rules.
A.

New York Internal Policies

Until the passage of the new discovery statute, the level of
variance from the provisions of article 240 depended on the
internal policies of District Attorneys’ Offices at the county level.
In New York City, the variations in discovery practices between
Brooklyn and Manhattan represent the most liberal and most
restrictive standards, respectively. Even under the old discovery
regime, a defendant arrested on the Kings County side of the
Brooklyn Bridge would have received broad discovery comparatively early through voluntary disclosures, whereas on the
Manhattan side of the bridge, that same defendant would have
received little more than what was required by the strict letter of
article 240.89 Brooklyn has a long-standing internal policy of
“open file” or voluntary discovery.90 Under the Brooklyn policy,
defense counsel typically received the police report, along with
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See Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist’s Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2011
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NYSBA REPORT, supra note 14, at 50.
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Id.
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Dan Svirsky, The Cost of Strict Discovery: A Comparison of Manhattan and
Brooklyn Criminal Cases, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 523, 524 (2014).
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NYCLA SURVEY, supra note 22, at 8.
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any case updates, body-worn camera footage, 911 recordings,
photographs of injuries or property damage, and surveillance
footage within four to six weeks of the filing of an indictment or
misdemeanor information.91 However, other than a broad commitment to “open file” discovery, Brooklyn apparently did not
have a specific written discovery policy delineating material that
prosecutors were required to disclose.92
By contrast, discovery practice in Manhattan was far more
restrictive under article 240 and more closely mirrored the text of
the statute. Manhattan prosecutors provided a Voluntary Disclosure Form (“VDF”) in response to discovery demands in
omnibus motions.93 Defense practitioners generally did not receive discovery until the eve of hearing or trial.94 In misdemeanor cases particularly, VDFs were typically not disclosed until
immediately before the People announced ready for trial.95
Moreover, defense attorneys characterized the VDFs received in
response to motions as “incomplete,” “non-responsive,” and often
inaccurate.96 Additionally, defense attorneys reported that the
scope and timing of pretrial discovery disclosures depended
greatly on the individual ADA.97 The District Attorney’s Office
indicated that there was no written discovery policy but that
“judges and regular practitioners [were] aware of it through
longstanding practice.”98
Unlike the federal system, where discovery practices have
broadened through judicially created rules, New York has seen
minimal judicial involvement in this issue. Chief Judge of the
New York Court of Appeals, Janet DiFiore, announced new rules
regarding criminal discovery on November 8, 2017.99 However,
other than reminding prosecutors and defense attorneys of their
existing discovery obligations, the only new guidance was a
91
Interview with Paul Magel, Staff Att’y, Brooklyn Defs. Servs., in Queens, N.Y.
(Oct. 9, 2019).
92
NYCLA SURVEY, supra note 22, at 8–9.
93
Id. at 9.
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Id.
95
Telephone Interview with Margaret Darocha & Amanda Barfield, Trial Att’ys,
N.Y. Cnty. Def. Servs. (Oct. 11, 2019) [hereinafter Darocha & Barfield Interview].
96
NYCLA SURVEY, supra note 22, at 9.
97
Darocha & Barfield Interview, supra note 95.
98
NYCLA SURVEY, supra note 22, at 9.
99
See generally Press Release, N.Y. State Unified Ct. Sys., Chief Judge DiFiore
Announces Implementation of New Measure Aimed at Enhancing the Delivery of
Justice in Criminal Cases (Nov. 8, 2017), http://ww2.nycourts.gov/sites/default/files/
document/files/2018-05/PR17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJ9G-YXNJ].
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statement that disclosures are “presumptively ‘timely’ ” if made
thirty days prior to trial or fifteen days prior to the hearing.100
Without substantive statewide guidance, discovery practices between offices were a patchwork of unwritten and unenforceable
discovery policies that varied from county to county and failed to
provide either predictability or transparency.
B. Federal Internal Policies and Local Rules
In both individual district offices and at the national level,
federal prosecutors have adopted internal policies based on both
practical and equitable concerns, which provide for broader pretrial discovery than statutorily required.101 Regarding the Jencks
Act, which does not require the disclosure of witness statements
until after direct examination, one District Court Judge remarked, “[s]ince the Jencks Act is utterly impractical, it is
routinely ignored.”102 Further, that judge noted that it was “common practice” for federal prosecutors in Massachusetts to
“disclose Jencks Act materials voluntarily at the commencement
of trial, if not before.”103 Individual United States Attorneys’ Offices adopt their own formal or informal discovery procedures
concerning Jencks material. For example, in 1990, the United
States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York
(“EDNY”) adopted a policy of voluntarily disclosing information
related to the testimony of government informants in prior cases,
although there was no requirement to do so.104 In 1999, a similar
policy was adopted as a written manual by the United States Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of California (“NDCA”),
when one of the drafters of the original EDNY policy memo was

100

N.Y. STATE JUST. TASK FORCE, REPORT ON ATTORNEY RESPONSIBILITY IN
CRIMINAL CASES 16 (2017), http://www.nyjusticetaskforce.com/pdfs/2017JTFAttorneyDisciplineReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/MC8T-WALU].
101
See, e.g., Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Just., to Dep’t Prosecutors, Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding Criminal Discovery
(Jan. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Ogden Memo], https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/
memorandum-department-prosecutors [https://perma.cc/J9D8-NN62]; U.S. Dep’t of
Just., Just. Manual § 9-5.001(C) (2020).
102
Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Discovery of Jencks Witness Statements: Timing
Makes a Difference, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 678 (1999) (quoting United States v.
Owens, 933 F. Supp. 76, 78 (D. Mass. 1996) (alteration in original)).
103
Owens, 933 F. Supp. at 78.
104
Eric S. Fish, Prosecutorial Constitutionalism, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 237, 273
(2017); Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC., at iii,
xxviii (2015).
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serving as the head of the Criminal Division there.105 But that
policy was abandoned as of 2002 following the appointment of a
new United States Attorney in that district.106 At the national
level, Department of Justice (“DOJ”) guidelines, located in the
Justice Manual (formerly the United States Attorneys’ Manual)
provide for pretrial discovery beyond the scope of Rule 16 in
certain areas.107
In addition to the Justice Manual, guidance on discovery is
provided through internal memoranda. In the wake of the infamous prosecution of former Alaska Senator Ted Stevens, the DOJ
established a working group to address policies related to discovery and case management.108 Subsequently, Deputy Attorney
General David Ogden issued a memorandum regarding criminal
discovery practice.109 The Ogden memo emphasized the importance of prompt disclosures of exculpatory evidence and encouraged prosecutors “to provide broad and early discovery consistent
with any countervailing considerations.”110 The memo included
no specific guidance on the timing of such disclosures, merely
encouraging prosecutors to exchange exculpatory information
“reasonably promptly” and impeachment evidence “at a reasonable time before trial.”111 Regarding pre-plea disclosure, the Ogden
memo simply reminds prosecutors to “be attentive to controlling
law in their circuit and district governing disclosure obligations
at various stages of litigation.”112 Despite the fact that ninetyseven percent of all federal convictions are the result of pleas,113
both the Justice Manual and the Ogden memo focus almost
105

Kozinski, supra note 104.
Id.
107
See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual, § 9-5.001(C) (2020).
108
Ellen S. Podgor, Pleading Blindly, 80 MISS. L.J. 1633, 1633–34, 1646 (2011).
Senator Stevens’s conviction on corruption related charges was ultimately set aside
after evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, including the concealment of Brady
material, came to light. Regarding the Ted Stevens prosecution, see generally, Report
to Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan of Investigation Conducted Pursuant to the Court’s
Order, Dated Apr. 7, 2009, In re Special Proceedings, 842 F. Supp. 2d 232 (D.D.C.
2012) (Misc. No. 09-0198), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/files/Stevens_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NE57-Q9N2].
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See generally Ogden Memo, supra note 101.
110
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111
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U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 56 tbl.11 (2018), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/
files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2018/2018-AnnualReport-and-Sourcebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/QHG5-FE69].
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exclusively on discovery practice in relation to trial. Furthermore,
although these internal policies provide for greater discovery
than Rule 16 and Brady, neither the Justice Manual policies nor
the memoranda guidelines are judicially enforceable “absent an
‘independent constitutional’ basis” for relief.114 As such, if internal
policies are ignored, there is virtually no recourse for criminal
defendants.115
The restrictive nature of both Rule 16 and the Jencks Acts
has led judges in many districts to adopt local rules which
broaden the scope of criminal discovery.116 A survey of federal
local rules identified thirty-eight districts that broadened the
scope of materials subject to disclosure and established timelines
for the disclosure of Brady material.117 These local rules enumerate further categories of discoverable material in addition to
those in Rule 16 and eliminate the Rule 16 materiality requirement.118 Additionally, many local rules have incorporated an
explicit Brady requirement, rather than merely referencing the
government’s constitutional discovery obligations.119 In some districts, the local rules broaden Brady “by eliminating the . . .
‘materiality’ requirement” and instead mandating the disclosure
of all evidence favorable to the defendant.120
However, the weakness of district-specific rules is demonstrated by the range of timing requirements for Brady material
in such local rules. The timeline for Brady disclosure in local
rules runs the gamut from “within [fourteen] days after arraignment” to “not less than [seven] days before trial” to “in time for
effective use at trial.”121 Out of all of the districts with local discovery rules, only Massachusetts requires any sort of pre-plea
disclosure specifically.122 As such, while there is a trend toward
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Podgor, supra note 108, at 1636; Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice
Guidelines: Balancing “Discretionary Justice,” 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 167,
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COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL RULES 11–17 (2011); Daniel S. McConkie, The Local Rules
Revolution in Criminal Discovery, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 59 (2017).
117
HOOPER ET AL., supra note 116.
118
McConkie, supra note 116, at 80.
119
Id. at 80–81.
120
HOOPER ET AL., supra note 116, at 11.
121
Id. at 14–15.
122
Id. app. B at 11.

546

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:529

the broadening of federal criminal discovery through local rules,
the disparate approaches adopted by various districts has resulted in inconsistent standards. Moreover, the local rules are
generally trial-centric and fail to address the issue of pre-plea
disclosures.
III. THE WEAKNESSES OF NON-STATUTORY APPROACHES
The problem of adapting a trial-based system of discovery to
a plea-based system of criminal justice is best solved through
legislative reform rather than local rules, prosecutorial policy, or
reliance on constitutional jurisprudence. Not only is a statutory
approach consistent with the nature of discovery as a statutory
right, but a judicially enforceable statutory requirement also
serves as a legislative and judicial check on the prosecutorial
power of the executive.
While informal discovery policies put in place by prosecutors’
offices help to ameliorate the harshest effects of strict discovery
practice, it cannot serve as a meaningful substitute for statutory
reform. The various discovery policies in New York under the old
statute illustrate some of the pitfalls of reliance on informal
practice. These policies varied wildly from borough to borough and,
in some cases, from ADA to ADA.123 Furthermore, the use of unwritten policies undermines both accountability and consistency.
Even where such office-level policies are written, as is the case
with some federal guidelines,124 they vary from district to district
and may be rescinded at any time.125 Because such policies only
exist at the pleasure of the specific District or United States
Attorney, they provide limited predictability. Both the vast degree of variance between offices and the lack of transparency in
the formation and application of such policies promote disparate
outcomes. Given how critical adequate discovery is for ensuring
the fairness of pretrial procedure, “[c]ompliance with the government’s disclosure obligations cannot be left to the political
vagaries of [ninety-three United States] Attorneys’ offices and
the countless District Attorneys’ offices across the country.”126
In addition to being inconsistent and opaque, such internal
policies are not judicially enforceable. If individual prosecutors
123

See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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or bureaus choose to deviate from their internal guidelines,
defendants are left with no recourse unless they can articulate
“an ‘independent constitutional’ basis” for relief.127 The DOJ Justice Manual, for example, states that it “is not intended to, does
not, and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive
or procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil
or criminal.”128 Without a mechanism for judicial enforcement,
internal policies are of limited use in ensuring adequate pretrial
disclosures. However, local rules on discovery practices at the
federal level also suffer from the problem of producing inconsistent results across jurisdictions. Although a judicially enforceable rule is preferable to an internal policy, district-level rules fail
to solve the problem of geographic inconsistency. As demonstrated by the wide range of timelines set for the disclosure of Brady
material in various local rules, defendants relying on such rules
will experience divergent practices depending on that court’s
specific rule.129
Faced with the inconsistency and unpredictability of local
rules and internal policies, some scholars have called for the
expansion of the Brady right to the realm of plea negotiation.130
However, on a fundamental level, Brady is ill-suited for the task
of promoting better informed and more accurate plea agreements.
Compared to the broad pre-plea discovery required in statutes
such as CPL section 245.25, Brady is an extremely limited right.
The only disclosure required under Brady is of evidence that is
both “favorable” to the defendant and “material either to guilt or
to punishment.”131
The materiality requirement both limits the scope of any
discovery which may be developed by such a rule and continues
the consolidation of prosecutorial power during plea negotiation.
The materiality limit on Brady evidence requires the prosecutor
to step into the role of the defense attorney to determine what
may be “material” without knowledge of the defense theory of the
case or trial strategy.132 The manner in which the term “material”
127
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L. REV. 3599, 3645–47 (2013).
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is defined by the prosecutor will determine the scope of discovery
received by the defendant prior to trial.133 Judicially unenforceable internal policies encouraging prosecutors to err on the side
of caution when making Brady disclosures are not sufficient.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s suggestion in dicta that
prosecutors avoid “tacking too close to the wind” when making
Brady determinations is similarly insufficient because it neither
provides substantive guidance to prosecutors nor creates any
enforceable right for defendants.134
In addition to the limitations imposed by the materiality
requirement, Brady requires no disclosure of inculpatory evidence,135 which is important both for ensuring that plea agreements are fully informed and for inducing more accurate plea
agreements earlier in the process. Disclosure of inculpatory evidence helps to ensure the disclosure of exculpatory evidence,
which may not be recognized as such by the prosecutor.136
Additionally, even for factually guilty defendants, the disclosure
of inculpatory evidence is necessary to ensure fully informed
guilty pleas.137
On a structural level, Brady is a poor tool for pre-plea
disclosure because it is a rule which is “enforced only retrospectively” after a conviction has already been obtained.138 Post-plea
Brady claims face a number of obstacles in practical application.139 Brady claims after a guilty plea must show that the
newly disclosed evidence in question was both favorable and
material to guilt or punishment in the absence of a trial record.140
Additionally, the level of skepticism demonstrated by the courts
in finding nondisclosures “material” in Brady claims after a jury
conviction will only be magnified after a defendant’s courtroom

696–97 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (discussing the challenges faced by prosecutors in appreciating how evidence in their own files may be favorable to the
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confession of guilt.141 Brady, local rules, and internal policies are
all inadequate vehicles for ensuring equitable pre-plea discovery
when compared to a legislative approach that produces consistent, transparent, and enforceable discovery rules.
IV. THE NEED FOR PRETRIAL DISCOVERY IN PLEA NEGOTIATIONS
The overall liberalization of the New York discovery statute,
taken together with the requirement for pre-plea disclosures,
highlights both the ways in which traditional discovery methods
fail to adequately serve a plea-based system and the importance
of statutory reform. Due to the sheer volume of cases which are
resolved through pleas, the most critical phase of the process for
criminal defendants has shifted from trial to plea negotiation.
Ninety-six percent of all criminal cases in New York state and
ninety-seven percent at the federal level are resolved via plea
agreement rather than trial.142 Defendants who engage in plea
negotiation in lieu of trial generally do so without the discovery
which would be disclosed close to or on the eve of trial.143
Additionally, plea agreements are often contingent upon the
defendant’s waiver of her right to post-plea discovery.144 Such
waivers prevent a defendant who has pleaded guilty from determining if, for example, Brady material was withheld prior to a
plea.
A threshold matter in any discussion of plea bargaining is
recognition of the fact that factually innocent and factually guilty
defendants plead guilty. The National Registry of Exonerations
identifies 547 cases to date of post-plea exonerations145 and the
Innocence Project lists thirty-one individuals who pleaded guilty
and were subsequently exonerated using DNA evidence.146 There
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are numerous pressures on both factually innocent and factually
guilty defendants to enter a plea, rather than risk going to trial.147
Pretrial detention, recurring court dates, and the mere fact of
having an open criminal case can disrupt the defendant’s life,
leading to loss of employment or custody, as well as immigration
consequences.148 Additionally, overcharging and charges which
carry mandatory minimums push even factually innocent defendants to plead guilty in order to avoid the possibility of vastly
harsher punishment at trial.149 Innocent defendants may also
plead guilty due to structural pressures which have the effect of
penalizing defendants for going to trial.150 As such, pre-plea discovery is necessary to ensure both procedural and substantive
fairness.
More robust pre-plea disclosures benefit defendants, prosecutors, and the courts by promoting more accurate plea agreements
and earlier plea agreements, and by supporting greater judicial
economy. The “shadow-of-trial” theory of litigation, which started
as a civil concept, has been applied by scholars to criminal cases
as well.151 Under this theory in the criminal context, rational
parties will anticipate their chances at trial, discounted by the
potential sentence in the event of conviction, and then use that
calculus to come to a bargain.152 There are many complications
in applying this theory of litigation to criminal cases, but the
basic idea of plea negotiation as based on a risk assessment
remains valid, in theory at least.153 However, in a system with
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severe informational imbalances, criminal defendants are not
able to make the sort of risk assessments envisioned by the
shadow-of-trial theory of litigation.154
Pre-plea disclosure can also induce earlier plea agreements
in strong cases.155 It is not uncommon for defendants to refuse
initial plea offers when they lack the benefit of pretrial discovery,
prolonging negotiations until disclosures are made close to trial
and thereby wasting resources.156 This idea of encouraging guilty
pleas by providing greater information is at the heart of the
federal practice of “reverse proffers.”157 During a reverse proffer,
the prosecutor explains to the defendant the evidence marshaled
against her, usually making disclosures beyond what is required
by Brady and Rule 16.158 However, there are no formal policies
regarding reverse proffers, meaning that the timing and scope of
such sessions are determined by individual prosecutors.159
Regardless, reverse proffers are useful for reaching earlier
pretrial resolutions through plea agreements.160 By the same
token, requiring pre-plea disclosure would also produce greater
efficiency by leading “prosecutors to ‘weed out’ the weakest cases”
earlier in the process.161
When there is limited pre-plea discovery, there is an incentive for prosecutors to engage in a degree of “bluffing” in weak
cases or cases where there are potential issues of admissibility of
key evidence.162 Bluffing as used in this context does not refer to
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violations of legal or ethical rules.163 Rather, it refers to situations where the prosecutor has concluded in good faith that there
is probable cause, but, for any number of reasons, is not convinced that she would be able to prove the charges beyond a
reasonable doubt at that time.164 Prosecutorial bluffing can “take
many forms,” ranging from mere puffery to more overt practices,
such as overcharging or bringing charges which carry a mandatory minimum to serve as leverage early on.165 It can also consist
of more subtle practices, such as announcing trial readiness without truly being prepared to go to trial, with the knowledge that
they will receive additional time to prepare due to court backlogs,
as was suggested by the Bronx DA training materials.166 This
type of bluffing can be particularly effective against factually
innocent defendants who lack the sort of personal knowledge of
the allegations that a factually guilty defendant would possess.167
Pre-plea discovery obligations both require prosecutors to make
an earlier, more in-depth assessment of their case and allows
defendants to negotiate on a level playing field.
Pre-plea discovery promotes greater accuracy and fairness in
plea agreements. It is a well-accepted principle of negotiation
theory that an imbalance in information creates an advantage for
one side in the bargaining process.168 The plea bargaining process is no exception, and defendants’ ability to negotiate depends
on their access to information. Historically, the prosecution has
been afforded broad discretion to withhold pre-plea discovery,
which can result in inequitable plea agreements, especially on
weak cases.169
On a structural level, the plea bargaining process consolidates
the lion’s share of both the procedural power and substantive
information in the hands of the prosecution, particularly without
pre-plea discovery. In this context, charging decisions, plea offers,
sentencing recommendations, and, in the absence of a contrary
statute or rule, discovery disclosures are all left to the discretion
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of the prosecution.170 This concentration of power largely removes
the traditional “checks and balances” of power between the
legislature, prosecution, trial and appellate judges, and juries.171
A statutory requirement of pre-plea discovery introduces a legislative counterbalance to the broad power held by the prosecution
in this phase.
Because there is “no general constitutional right” to criminal
discovery, most criminal defendants who engage in plea negotiation do so without the majority of discovery which they would
have received otherwise.172 Although prosecutors may turn over
early discovery depending on the jurisdiction and internal policies of their office, there are no enforceable pre-plea discovery
standards unless they are created by local rule or statute. Even
the question of whether Brady applies to plea negotiation is the
subject of a circuit split and has not been addressed by the
Supreme Court.173 The lack of enforceable discovery requirements denies defendants the benefits of the protections afforded
by due process and erodes the structural checks and balances of
the criminal justice system.
Critics have raised various arguments in opposition to broad
pretrial discovery. First among these arguments is concern about
witness safety.174 In his testimony on the implementation of the
criminal reform package, Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus
Vance argued that the required disclosure of Rosario material
and witness information would endanger witnesses and discour-
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age cooperation with law enforcement.175 However, either party
may obtain a protective order upon a showing of good cause
under article 245.176 In the event of an adverse ruling on an
order of protection with regard to witness information, the party
seeking the order is entitled to expedited review.177 Additionally,
counties where the District Attorney’s office has adopted an
internal open file discovery policy have not seen any impact on
witness security.178 Brooklyn District Attorney Eric Gonzalez remarked that “[o]ur ‘open file discovery’ practice has not resulted
in the negative outcomes some reform opponents fear. The safety
of victims and witnesses is not compromised by our practice and
they are not discouraged from coming forward.”179 Furthermore,
other states that require even broader disclosure of witness
information by statute have not experienced the type of witness
intimidation or tampering which has been cautioned against
here.180 The use of protective orders ensures witness safety without needlessly denying vital information to the defendant.
Requiring a showing of good cause before a judge and allowing
for ex parte applications and expedited review of adverse rulings
balances the interests of the defendant and the prosecution, all
the while preserving witness safety.
Opponents of broad pretrial disclosure also argue that the
expense of early discovery makes such a requirement cost prohibitive.181 However, this argument is without merit. While the
initial implementation of new requirements may have required
additional funding for the transition period, broad and early
discovery is likely to promote greater judicial and prosecutorial
economy of resources over time. Formalized pre-plea discovery
promotes efficiency by inducing earlier pleas in strong cases and
earlier dismissals in weak cases. Delayed disclosure, or even strict
compliance with restrictive discovery rules, can result in costly
delays and continuances.182 Strict compliance with the statutory
timeline in the Jencks Act, for example, would result in disrup175
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tive midtrial delays and adjournments to allow for defense inspection of the newly disclosed material.183 An automatic and
standardized process for discovery eliminates the expense of
motion practice for the prosecution, the defense, and the courts.184
Additionally, other states have statutory requirements that go
beyond the disclosures required in article 245, yet there is “not a
shred of evidence that these criminal justice systems have
suffered any drop in efficiency as a result.”185 Furthermore,
voluntary internal practices of early and broad disclosure, such
as open file discovery in Brooklyn and the practice of offering
reverse proffers at the federal level, indicate that the costs are
outweighed by the benefits.186
CONCLUSION
Unlike the alternative approaches to discovery reform, statutory reform creates a judicially enforceable right and consistency
across jurisdictions. A statutory requirement for pre-plea discovery, as seen in New York CPL section 245.25, rebalances the
distribution of power in the plea bargaining context by imposing
a legislative check on the prosecutorial power of the executive.
Additionally, statutory reform promotes fairness at a broader
level by ensuring that defendants in different jurisdictions have
access to the same type of discovery. One of the guiding principles of criminal justice policy is the avoidance of disparate outcomes for similarly situated defendants. Without reasonably
equal access to pre-plea discovery, there will be dissimilar outcomes for defendants in similar cases.187
There is no doubt that the regulation of pretrial discovery
practice involves a complex balancing of interests. This weighing
of competing interests is precisely why the problem of discovery
in the pretrial context calls for a legislative solution, rather than
a judicial or prosecutorial one. Because this is essentially a
policy question, it is the proper role of the legislature, not
prosecutors, to gather input and establish a rule that balances
the practical and ethical concerns at issue.
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While the discovery deficits in Mr. Gills’s robbery case did
not prevent him from being acquitted after trial, he is an exception to the rule.188 The deficiencies of traditional pretrial discovery practice are not cured by the procedural safeguards of a trial
for more than ninety-five percent of defendants who take a
plea.189 In a system where plea negotiation is the norm for the
overwhelming majority of defendants, it is both unrealistic and
unfair to maintain a trial-centric system of discovery. A creature
of statute from birth, criminal discovery is most appropriately
reformed through legislative action.
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